INTRODUCTION
In his treatise, Federal Jurisdiction, Erwin Chemerinsky advocates protection for citizens through litigation on their behalf by sovereign entities under parens patriae' standing.' "[I]n a society in which litigation costs are enormous and the protection of constitutional rights is imperative, allowing the government to sue on behalf of its citizens can provide essential safeguards that otherwise might be lacking. ", 3 This is especially true for Native Americans, as Lawrence Baca, President of the American Indian Bar Association, notes with regard to racial discrimination:
Where racial issues and civil rights are concerned, the national conscience has largely passed over American Indians. Indians are trapped in a national consciousness that perceives [them] as historical relics and western movie backdrops. Indian people often perceive that the very institutions of government that were established to fight race based discrinmination have failed to include American Indians among the protected classes. 4 The economic situation in which most Native American people live only reinforces the problematic nature of strictly individual assertions of rights! 1. Parens patriae is often defined as:
literally parent of the country, refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disability, such as juveniles or the insane, and in child custody determinations, when acting on behalf of the state to protect the interests of the child. It is the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents. It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (internal quotes and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that the State must be acting as an advocate for the injured party. See Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U. S. 199, 219 (1990) . ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 114 (3d ed. 1999) (arguing for expanded parens patriae standing for governments).
See
3. Id. (specifically arguing for federal parens patriae standing). 4. Lawrence Baca, One Color Short of a Rainbow, 44 FED. LAW. 12, 15 (1997) .
For example:
The 1990 census reports that 31 percent of all Indians live below the poverty level. That figure is up from 1980, when 24 percent of all Indians, and 29 percent of reservation Indians, were living below poverty level. Per capita income for Native Americans was slightly more than $8,300, the lowest of all racial groups in the U.S., and less than half the [VOL. 5:665
Protecting Native Americans
Within the federal system, three types of sovereigns exist: Federal, State, and Native American Tribal governments. The Federal government has restricted the legal definition of Native American to members of federally recognized Tribes.
6 Native American tribal sovereignty is often split into two categories: internal and external. 7 Internal sovereignty includes the expansion of tribal law governing institutions, as well as economic and social infrastructure." Native American Tribes also fight external incursions on their sovereignty from both State and Federal Governments. 9 More recently, indigenous peoples from around the globe have joined forces to create international protections for their people and institutions. Native American Tribes struggle to retain their sovereign internal and external rights in order to protect their members."
The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as several Federal District Courts, have accepted Tribes litigating under the doctrine of parens patriae, although without analysis.
12 When Courts have dealt with the level for the entire population. As of 1991, the Indian unemployment rate was 45 percent. That was a 3 percent decrease since 1989, but still 37 percent higher than the average unemployment rate for the United States as a whole.
DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 15 (4th ed. 1998).
6. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (1999) ("Indian Tribe ... means any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, pueblo, village, or community within the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior presently acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe.").
Although this is the definition used in Federal Indian Law, Native communities are far more accepting than the Federal Government of those not enrolled in a federally recognized Tribe as Native American. For a variety of reasons, many individuals have fallen through the cracks of enrollment procedures; thus Native American identity in Native communities is functionally defined by association with a community, in addition to self-identification, as well as by membership. See generally M. Annettee Jaimes, Some Kind of Indian: On Race, Eugenics, and Mixed-Bloods, in (Naomi Zack ed., 1995) (arguing for a reconception of Indian identity based on traditional indigenous methods).
7. See Robert Clinton, Panel at the University of Michigan Native American Law Students Association's American Indian Law Day (Mar. 26, 1999 (1996) .
11. The concept of seven generations is common among Native Americans. An individual's actions affect the next seven generations as well as the past seven generations. The individual has the responsibility to act accordingly. Generally, Tribal governments focus their projects on providing services or protection for their members.
12. Parens patriae is the legal doctrine that provides standing for sovereign entities to bring suit on behalf of their " Derived from British common law, the doctrine of parens patriae grew out of the royal prerogative. 16 The King, as "father of the country," fulfilled the role of guardian over individuals with legal disabilities-those who could not protect themselves, such as "infants, idiots, and lunatics., REv. 193, 197-202 (1970) 251, 257 (1972) ("This concept of parens patriae is derived from the English constitutional system. As the system developed from its feudal beginnings, the King retained certain duties and powers, which were referred to as the 'royal prerogative.' These powers and duties were said to be exercised by the King in his capacity as 'father of the country.' Traditionally, the term was used to refer to the King's power as guardian of persons under legal disabilities to act for themselves.") (citations omitted); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47 ("He is the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics, and has the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom.") ( doctrine of parens patriae allows sovereign entities to bring suit for the protection and well-being of their citizens, but representation is not limited to those who are legally disabled. 24 In the United States, a sovereign can sue on behalf of those who cannot sue for themselves and on behalf of some or all of its citizens in order to protect its quasi-sovereign inter-25 ests.
Although the Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of parens patriae in 1900, it did not significantly elaborate upon it until the 1982
26
Snapp decision. The Court, dealing with the claims brought by States, has developed two conditions for sovereigns to claim parens patriae standing when not suing on behalf of those who cannot sue for themselves . First, the sovereign entity "must express a quasi-sovereign interest.
' '2 ' The Court specifically distinguished quasi-sovereign interests of a State from sovereign and non-sovereign interests.
29 First:
[S]overeign interests are easily identified: First, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities with the relevant jurisdiction-this involves the power to create and enforce a legal code ....
[S]econd, the demand for case, the propriety and utility of parens patriae suits were clearly recognized.
Id. (citations omitted).
24. The traditional functions of the King, that of protector of individuals, "has relatively little to do with the concept of parens patriae standing that has developed in American law." Instead:
At a fairly early date, American courts recognized this common-law concept, but now in the form of a legislative prerogative: "This prerogative of parens patriae is often necessary to be exercised in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600 (citing Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) only for the sake of the real party in interest.
The Court stated that quasi-sovereign interests "consist[ ] of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its populace.
3 2 Although the Court has not defined quasi-sovereign interest, it has articulated two categories of quasi-sovereign interests that trigger parens patriae standing.
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-beingboth physical and economic-of its residents in general., 34 The Court also allows standing when "a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system., 3 For example, in Snapp, Puerto Rico filed suit against "numerous individuals and companies engaged in the apple industry in Virginia," asserting the rights of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers who were denied work in violation of the Wagner-Peyser Act. Both retarded persons and community residents are deprived of being able to live in integrated communities. The analogy to racial discrimination is close indeed. Thus, the State of New York's interest in "the health and well-being... of its residents in general, the primary category of quasi-sovereign interests, is clearly implicated here.
Id. at 39 (internal citations omitted).
35. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607. The Snapp Court explained: "we find that Puerto Rico does have parens patriae standing to pursue the interests of its residents in the Commonwealth's fall and equal participation in the federal employment service scheme established pursuant to the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Id. at 609.
36. Id. at 597.
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Protecting Native Americans Puerto Rico had parens patriae standing that fell into both categories: Puerto Rico was acting in the interest of its citizens' health and wellbeing, 37 and on behalf of its citizens' rights to participate in the federal system and have all federal rights applied to them. 3 8 The second requirement for parens patriae standing is that the State's litigation be on behalf of a "substantial portion of the State's population., 39 The Court first articulated this requirement in 1923, in a suit on behalf of citizens using natural gas: "[t]he private consumers in each state not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities but constitute a substantial portion of the State's population. 4 0 The Court in Snapp rephrased this requirement to "sufficiently substantial segment of its population.
1
The Court has refrained from defining the exact proportion of the population required to create standing. 42 However, the Court has said that a court must consider the "indirect effects of the injury" in addition to the direct impact "in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficient substantial segment of its population." 43 For example, regardless of the fact that only 787 jobs were specifically at issue in Snapp, the Court found that Puerto Rico met the burden since "[d]eliberate efforts to stigmatize the labor force as inferior carry a universal sting.""
II. TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN ENTITIES HAVE RETAINED

PARENS PATRIAE STANDING
Parens patriae standing exists only in sovereign entities. 4 The Court explains the link between sovereignty and parens patriae standing as the 
A. The Nature of Tribal Sovereignty
As Frank Pommersheim notes, "[a] substantial amount of the adversity and difficulty present throughout the history of Indian law stems from the fact that the tribal sovereign is consistently marginalized, if even discussed, in the context of our constitutional democracy. 4 7 Although the Federal Government recognizes the inherent sovereign rights of Tribes, acceptance and enforcement of tribal sovereignty is difficult given the lack of general education and understanding of tribal rights. 8 To give context and understanding to tribal parens patriae standing, a brief discussion of the sovereign powers retained by Tribes is warranted.
As Felix Cohen recognized in the first edition of his frequently-cited handbook, each Tribe has the right to self-government:
The most basic of all Indian rights, the right of selfgovernment, is the Indian's last defense against administrative oppression, for in a realm where the states are powerless to govern and where Congress, occupied with more pressing national affairs, cannot govern wisely and well, there remains a large no-man's-land in which government can emanate only from officials of the Interior Department or from the Indians themselves. Self- These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians.") (emphasis in original).
51.
See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 590-92 (holding that the Federal Government had the exclusive right, as opposed to States, to deal with Native American Tribes); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 ("[Tribes] may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a tide independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.") (emphasis added); McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 587 (holding that the Federal Government had the exclusive right to extinguish aboriginal tide).
52. The term "contact" refers to the first interactions between Europeans and indigenous peoples in the Western hemisphere. "Discovery" and other commonly used terms, beside being Euro-centric, ignore the reciprocal impacts between continents and multiple groups of people. "Contact" more accurately reflects the nature of the meetings of these peoples and the subsequent impacts.
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Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.5 3
The Federal Government has repeatedly acknowledged and supported Tribes' "quasi-sovereign interest [s] in the health and well-beingboth physical and economic-of [their] residents in general."-4 According to Cohen:
Indian self-government, the decided cases hold, includes the power of an Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of government of the Indian's choosing, to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, and to administer justice. Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions ... is the principle that those powers which are lawfilly vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal Government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been limited from time to time by special treaties and laws designed to take from Indian tribes control of matters which, in the judgment of Congress, these tribes could no longer be safely permitted to handle. The statutes of Congress, then, must be examined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty rather than to determine its sources or its positive content. What is not expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty. The Federal Government has a fiduciary duty to protect Tribes, but at the same time it preserves unilateral authority to divest Tribal Governments of their sovereign and property rights. Given 70. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) ("They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great fEther.").
71. See Passamaquoddy v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir. 1975 ) ("The general notion of a 'trust relationship,' often called a guardian-ward relationship, has been used to characterize the resulting relationship between the federal government and those tribes."); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942): Furthermore, this Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people. In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the Government is something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the more exacting fiduciary standards.
Id. Recently, Justice Stevens noted:
Throughout our Nation's history, this Court has recognized both the plenary power of Congress over the affairs of native Americans and the fiduciary character of the special federal relationship with descendants of those once sovereign peoples. [VOL.
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Protecting Native Americans the nature of the federal responsibility and the confined nature of tribal powers allowed by the Federal Courts, the question arises whether a Tribe maintains a sovereign relationship such that it can protect its citi-73 zens.
First, the Federal Government's higher position in the hierarchy in the federal system is not a bar to tribal parens patriae standing. The Supreme Court has held that States have parens patriae standing despite their relative status to the Federal Government. 74 Second, regardless of the relationship between the Tribe and the Federal Government, the Tribe is a sovereign entity over its individual citizens.
7 ' The basic understanding of citizenship boils down to a social contract theory, where individuals take on rights and responsibilities in order to gain "protection, rights, and privileges" from the sovereign.
76
The relationship between the tribal entity and the individual members does not stray from this model. 191, 208 (1978) ("Indian tribes are proscribed from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.' ").
74. See Ryan & Sampen, supra note 16, at 686. However, parens patriae standing is not clear when claims are brought against the Federal Government. See id; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) ("A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government."); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ("[lI] t is the United States, and not the State, which represents them as parens patriae."). For further discussion on the implications of sovereign defendants, see infra Part IV.
75. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) (holding that the Santa Clara Pueblo had the sovereign right to adjudicate whether their membership criteria discriminated based upon gender); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884) (holding that individual Native Americans were not citizens of the United States because of their tribal citizenship) (overturned by legislation in 1924); Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883) (holding that a Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes of members) (subsequent legislation has affected this holding The relationship between the Federal Government and indigenous Tribes should not bar tribal parens patriae standing. Although the relationship between States and the Federal Government differs from that between Tribes and the Federal Government, the judicial construction of both as lower in the federal hierarchy should not bar standing. In addition, the relationship between the member and the Tribe is that of a citizen and a sovereign. As such, not only should a Tribe have the ability to litigate on behalf of its citizens, but it has a duty to protect them.
C. The Problem of Framing Tribal Sovereignty as Retained
In United States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court held that tribal sovereign rights are retained from pre-contact. 8 ' The Court constructed the source of tribal governing rights as inherent rather than derived from federal designation as an answer to whether concurrent criminal trials, in both Federal and Tribal Courts, amounted to Double Jeopardy. 2 The Court found no Double Jeopardy violation since tribal sovereign rights were retained rather than constructed from the same source as federal sovereignty. By framing tribal sovereignty as retained, the Court problematically left open the potential for the term retained to limit Tribal government practices to those utilized prior to contact rather than to what is necessary in the modem context. 4 This would make it difficult for Tribal governments to assert parens patriae standing, as the parens patriae doctrine was not conceived of, let alone exercised, prior to litigation in United States Courts.
79. For example, most Tribes allow members to vote and run for public office, but others allow religious leaders in the community to appoint public officials. Since the Bill of Rights does not limit the actions of Tribal Governments, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1968) , which applies most provisions of the Bill of Rights (but not separation of Church and State) to Native American Activities. See id.
80. Many Tribes provide governmental services, see supra Part II.B, as well as college scholarships and other similar programs. Tribes also provide tradition, culture, and identity to their members, partially through cultural outreach programs. For example, many Tribes offer language, dance, or arts and crafts workshops to their members.
81.
See 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978 [VOL. 5:665
Protecting Native Americans However, tribes have sovereign immunity, which they also did not have, of course, prior to contact. Thus, the term retained has not been used to limit tribal sovereign immunity." For example, in Martinez, a suit brought by a tribal member against her Tribe, the Court recognized that the Indian Civil Rights Act did not abrogate sovereign immunity regardless of whether the Tribe exercised this right prior to the Federal Constitution.
7 Thus, the term retained is merely a descriptive phrase, not a limitation on Tribes' ability to exercise modem sovereign powers.8
D. The State is Insuffident as Parens Patriae
Parens patriae standing for Tribes does not bar the State from litigating on behalf of its Native American citizens. Filing suit under parens patriae is within the sovereign's prerogative, after all; it is not mandatory. By not providing Tribes the right to litigate on behalf of their citizens, a substantial number of Native Americans are left unprotected.
The relationship between Native Americans and the State differs from that of other citizens, especially when in Indian Country. The Creek Nation was recognized by the United States as a distinct political community, with which it made treaties and which within its own territory administered its internal affairs. Like other governments, municipal as well as state, the Creek Nation was free from liability for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the peace. Such liability is frequently imposed by statute upon cities and counties (see City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 497); but neither Congress nor the Creek Nation had dealt with the subject by any legislation prior to 1908. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) 88. "Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory to the extent that sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty." Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 89. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) jurisdiction, retained sovereignty, and treaty rights are common. Not only is it often problematic for States to advocate on behalf of Tribal interests, it is common for States' own sovereign interests to be directly opposed to tribal members' well being. 94 In most cases, the State would not well serve the parens patriae function for the Native American citizens residing within its borders.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
III. TREATMENT OF TRIBAL PARENS PATRIAE STANDING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
This Part examines the incorrect application of parens patriae standing to tribal entities. First, this Part discusses the seminal Assiniboine case,95 which first applied the wrong standard for parens patriae standing. The nature of the misinterpretation will be examined by looking to current Supreme Court holdings on parens patriae. Second, this Part considers each of the four subsequent District Court cases in light of the Court's parens patriae rulings. Third, this Part advocates the application of current Supreme Court rulings on parens patriae to Tribal sovereigns.
over adoption proceedings when all parties are members of the Tribe and residing on the reservation 553, 592 (1923) .
The private consumers in each state not only include most of the inhabitants of many urban communities but constitute a substantial portion of the state's population. Their health, comfort, and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave public concern in which the state, as the representative of the public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest, but one which is immediate and recognized by law.
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The Court has not attempted to draw any definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must be adversely affected by the challenged behavior. Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficient substantial segment of its population.
05
Thus, the additional requirement of litigating on behalf of all citizens should not be applied to States or other sovereigns seeking standing under parens patriae; rather, the lesser standard of litigation on behalf of a significant portion of the population is required. For example, in Snapp the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was able to litigate on behalf of its citizens working as migrant farm-workers.'0 6 The State of New York was allowed to file suit on behalf of its mentally retarded citizens. 1 0 7 States have also filed anti-discrimination suits as parens patriae on behalf of a portion of their citizens.'° By looking to Louisiana v. Texas and not any contemporary parens patriae cases, the Assiniboine Court incorrectly required litigation on behalf of every member of the Tribe. This mistake barred the Tribe's standing to protect its citizens.
B. The Assiniboine Line of Cases
More problematic than the mistake in Assiniboine is the repeated reliance on its holding. The District Courts have not investigated the Supreme Court's elaboration of the parens patriae doctrine, but merely have reiterated the holding of Assiniboine. In the four subsequent Federal District Court cases, Tribes have been incorrectly barred from litigating as parens patriae. 110. 25 U.S.C. § § 1300b-11-1300b-16 (1983) .
[VOL. 5:665 Citing Assiniboine, the District Court denied standing to the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, holding that "a sovereign tribe must be acting on behalf of all of its members in order to litigate as parens patriae. '' 1 6 The Court used the Assiniboine misinterpretation, instead of looking at current Supreme Court opinions on parens patriae, to bar standing, even though the litigation was on behalf of a "substantial segment of its population.""1 7
The Lujan Court noted that " [w] hile all members of the Tribe may in some way be affected by the Band's reorganization, the Tribe would not be representing the interests of all members as the doctrine of parens patriae requires."" 8 In this statement, the District Court made two fundamental mistakes based upon the parens patriae doctrine laid out by the Supreme Court. First, the Court did not take into account indirect effects to determine whether the litigation was on behalf of a significant segment of the population." 9 Second, the Court failed to acknowledge that whether the sovereign "is doing more harm than good to her own The Big Sandy case arose out of a dispute over a school dress code, which restricted male students' hair length.'2 Specifically:
Boys' hair should be of reasonable length and style so as not [to] interfere with the instructional program. Boys' hair should [be] no longer than the top of a standard dress collar.
124
To members of the Alabama and Coushatta Tribes, though, long hair has religious significance.
12 ' The Big Sandy Court noted the common impact of the School's rule upon the Tribe's religious beliefs:
It was a common Native American belief that the hair, similar to other body parts, was sacred, and that to cut the hair was a complicated and significant procedure. A hair cut was considered the equivalent of dismemberment of a body part. Generally, hair was to be cut only as a sign of mourning a close family member's death. Southeastern tribes believed that, to cut the hair at any other time, without the safeguards of tribal ritual, would disrupt the 'oneness' of the person's spirit and subject that person's body to invasion by witchcraft.
126
At the time of the lawsuit, eighty-nine members of the student body were Tribal members. 127 The prohibition was enforced only against R-v. 217, 228 (1994 
